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NOTES AND CGOi1MENTS
but it is ten times as distasteful to kill?" On the other hand, should we support
the position of Judge Sherwood in Bartlett v. State and hold that human honor,
dignity, and right are in equal value to human life?
It appears that the very existence of such divergent views impels us inevitably
to the conclusion that the retreat rule should not stand as the final test of self-
defense, but rather should be but one factor in determining the guilt or innocence
of the defendant.
As Justice Holmes wrote in Brown v. U S., "Rationally the failure to retreat
is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order to determine wheth-
er the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing; not a categorical
proof of guilt."' An avenue of possible retreat should be a circumstance in the
case along with size and the location of parties, provocation, suddenness of com-
bat, and other factors a jury must weigh in determining whether the defendant
is to be excused for his homicide in self-defense.
ROBERT HALL SMITH
SOLICITATION AS A BASIS OF JURISDICTION OVER A
FOREIGN CORPORATION
The amenability of foreign corporations to suit in state courts has long been
a troublesome problem, both in state courts and, since the problem is essentially
one of due process, in federal courts. It has been said that in matters of junsdic
tion the courts tend to treat natural persons and corporations similarly, but this is
overstatement. On the other hand, the dictum of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle that "a corporation can have no legal existence out of
the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created,"' does not present a
realistic view of the situation. And yet, Taney s statement represented the pre-
vailing view at one time. Such a doctrine could not stand in an era in which
the corporation was fast becoming the most popular method of carrying on
business.
To meet the demands of practical necessity in subjecting foreign corporations
to proceedings in courts outside their state of domicil, various theories have been
advanced. As in the case of an individual, jurisdiction in personam may be ac
quired over a foreign corporation by consent. An agent may be appointed by
the corporation to accept service of process. The appointment of an agent or of
a state official to accept service of process is treated as consent to the exercise of
jurisdiction. Where such an appointment has been made by the corporation, it
is clear that there is actual consent to service of process and the state s courts
have junsdiction to render a valid judgment.' Where such an appointment is not
made consent is sometimes implied. The theory of "implied consent" supposes
that since a corporation may not enter a state without permission, its voluntary
entry into the state renders valid the assumption that it has impliedly assented to
- 256 U. S. 335, 343 (1921). Holmes went on to say, "Detached reflection
cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."
'Barrow Steamship Company v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1898).
13 Pet. 519 (U. S. 1839).
'Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling
Company 243 U. S. 93 (1917).
'Ibid.
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the statutory requirements of the state. Thus, if a state statute provides that
when no actual appointment of an agent is made that it will be deemed that a
state official is authorized to accept service of process, it is presumed that the cor-
poration by entering the state consents to this provision.
The consent theory is not broad enough to cover all situations where it is
clearly established, as a matter of law, that a foreign corporation can be sued.
For example, a state cannot exclude a foreign corporation which seeks to do only
interstate business. In such a case the consent theory is wholly inapplicable
unless the corporation actually consented to the jurisdiction of the state, because
implied consent is based on the power of the state to exclude the foreign corpora-
tion. Yet, the state can provide for suit, even in the absence of consente or power
to exclude the corporation, provided the corporation is doing acts which the courts
recogmze as sufficient to warrant an inference of "corporate presence." Such a
theory is based on the supposition that the corporation is actually present within
the state, a condition precedent to which is a finding that the corporation is "doing
business."8 The courts have been reluctant to formulate any definite rules as to
just what constitutes "doing business" usually stating that each case is to be de-
cided upon its own specific facts.' It has generally been held that when acts
done within the state constitute part of the corporation s business and are continu-
ous or of some duration, the corporation is "doing business" within the state."
It has been held that "mere solicitation" is not "doing business-' in the jurisdic-
tional sense." A recent decision of the Supreme Court, International Shoe Com-
pany v. Washington," has made such a holding dubious authority. Fundamentally,
it is the purpose of this paper to examine the implications of that decision.
Solicitation, as used in the jurisdictional sense, means the practice of corpor-
ate agents procuring or attempting to procure orders for the corporation. Those
orders are taken subject to the acceptance of the home office. When and if they
are accepted they are usually filled by shipping the product directly to the cus-
tomer from some point outside the state. In any large business engaged in selling
to the public, solicitation is essential to success. Probably no businessman would
seriously argue that solicitation is not "doing business" Yet the courts have held
for years that "mere solicitation" does not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements
of "doing business"
One of the first cases on solicitation of business as it relates to the junsdic-
tional problem was Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quncy Ry. Co.' The de-
fendant Railway Company was sued on a cause of action arising outside the
forum. The defendant's business orgamzation and trackage were not in the forum,
but in another jurisdiction. The defendant's agent who had been served with
process was employed to solicit freight and passenger traffic and for this purpose
- The Lafayette Insurance Company v. French, 18 How. 404 (U. S. 1855).
'International Harvester Company of America v. Kentucky, 234 U. S.
579 (1914).
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218
(1912).
' See Note 6 supra.
'See Note 7 supra, at 227.
" Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
" Green v. Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, 205 U. S.
580 (1907).
3'26 U. S. 310 (1945).
"205 U. S. 530 (1907).
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an office was maintained in the forum. He sold no tickets and received no pay-
ment for transportation of freight. The defendant denied its corporate presence
within the forum. The U. S. Supreme Court held:
"The business shown in this case was in substance noth-
ing more than that of solicitation. This is not enough to bring
the defendant within the district so that process can be served
upon it.""
This decision stood for years and may still stand as the primary authority in the
solicitation eases. However, it should be noted that the suit was brought on a
cause of action which arose outside the state of the forum. In the light of recent
decisions, it should not be overlooked that the Court may have been influenced
to a large extent by principles of fairness.
The question was again presented to the Supreme Court in International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky." The effect of this case was to modify greatly the
implications of the Green case. The court treated the earlier decision as an ex-
treme case, but did not overrule it. On the contrary, it expressly reaffirmed its
rule that solicitation alone was not enough to give a court jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation. However, the court distinguished the Green case on two grounds.
First, that in this case the authority to receive payment was given to the agent, "'
while in the Green case there was no such authority- and second, that the solici-
tation in this case resulted in a continuous stream of shipments into the state,
while in the Green case no goods were shipped into the state as a result of the
solicitation.
Four years later in Peoples Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., the court
vacated service of process upon a soliciting foreign corporation because "mere
solicitation" was not "doing business" for purposes of "corporate presence"
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky was distinguished on the ground that it
involved, in addition to a continuous course of solicitation, authority on the part
of the agents of the corporation to receive payments. After the Tobacco Co. de-
cision, the lower federal courts commenced to use the International Harvester Co.
case as a foundation for the thesis that solicitation plus something more consti-
tuted "doing business"
In Davega v. Lincoln Furniture Co.,"8 a foreign corporation s agent solicited
in New York, sending the orders to the home office for acceptance. In addition
to soliciting orders the agent occasionally assisted in the collection of overdue
accounts and had authority to make adjustments subject to company approval.
At infrequent intervals he sold goods that had been sent to New York as samples.
It was held, probably by analogy to the cases basing jurisdiction on "doing busi-
ness that the settlement of claims by the agent was too sporadic and that the
sale of samples too small a part of the company s total business to be considered
as a material addition to the solicitation. Thus in order to meet the "solicitation
plus" rule the additional activities had to be regular, and there was even a sug-
gestion that they had to constitute a substantial 'part of the corporations total
business.]"
"Id. at 533.
"See Note 6 supra.
"Id. at 586.
".246 U. S. 79 (1918).
"829 Fed. 2d. 164 (C.C.A. 2d 1928).
10 Id. at 167.
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In Barnett v. Texas & Pacific Ri., requisite additional activities over and
above solicitation were found. The acts deemed material were the selling of
tickets for transportation on the defendant's own lines, and the issuing of bills of
lading, all of which were done within the forum state. The court held that the
case did not fall within the rule in the Green case.
The foregoing decisions may now be well on the way toward becoming mat-
ters of only historical interest because of the recent decision of the Supreme Court
in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washngton, mentioned above." A foreign
corporation had its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. It had no
place of business in Washington where the suit was brought and made no con-
tracts there. During a period of years it employed salesmen whose activities
were directed by company officials in St. Louis. The salesmen worked on a com-
nission basis. They were supplied with samples whmch they displayed to retail
dealers. Sometimes they rented sample rooms for which they paid and were re-
imbursed by the corporation. Their authority was limited to the exhibition of
samples and the solicitation of orders at fixed prices. When orders were received
they were sent to St. Louis for acceptance or rejection. When the orders were
accepted the merchandise was shipped directly to the customers from points out-
side the State of Washington. The salesmen had no authority to contract or make
collections. In holding that the State of Washington had jurisdiction Chief Jus-
tice Stone departed from the "corporate presence" doctrine and announced a new
solution to the problem. The new theory advanced was that a state has jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corooration if the activities of the corporation in a state have
been such that to permit suit there would be in accordance with "fair play and
substantial justice."
In relaxing the presence theory the Chief Justice pointed to cases holding that
when the activities of a foreign corporation have been continuous and systematic,
the courts of the state have jurisdiction over the corporation as to actions arising
out of acts done within the foruin.-- He mentioned previous decisions of the
Supreme Court holding that where there is only a single or isolated acts of an
agent of a foreign corporation, the state where such acts occur has no jurisdiction
in actions arising out of such acts.' He next referred to a class of cases holding
that where there have been continuous operations of a substantial nature by a
foreign corporation, the state where these operations are earned on has jurisdiction
in actions arising out of acts done outside the state." He hlso cited cases where
jurisdiction is based on a single act done by a non-resident individual which gives
rise to the cause of action sued on,' as in the non-resident motorist cases. From
these decisions the conclusion was reached that the true criterion for determimng
whether or not a state has jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is not mechameal
or quantitive, but rather based upon the nature and quality of acts done within
the state. Reference was also made to the fact that a foreign corporation doing
acts within a state enjoys the benefit of the protection of the laws of that state;
that an obligation may anse out of such acts, and that to require the corporation
"- 145 Fed. 2d 800 (C.C.A. 2d 1944).
"' See Note 12 supra.
" Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245 (1909); Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 284 U. S. 579 (1914).
Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Company, 260 U. S. 516 (1923).
-' Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 852 (1927); Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242
U. S. 160 (1916).
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to respond to an action arising out of such acts could "hardly be said to be undue."
Does this decision mean that the general rule of the Green case, that mere
solicitation alone is not enough to give a state jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion, has been discarded in favor of the "fair play and substantial justice" rule?
Will International Shoe Co. case be held to its facts, the most important of which
indicate that the cause of action arose out of activities carried on within the state
of Waslungton? It should be recalled that in the Green case the cause of action
arose outside the state. Because of this difference it may well be argued that when
the Supreme Court is faced directly with the problem of whether solicitation alone
is sufficient to give a state jurisdiction that the Green and International Shoe Co.
cases will be distinguished on that ground. However there is nothing in the lan-
guage of the latter decision that would indicate such a distinction was intended.
The court might also harmonize its former ruling that solicitation alone is not
enough to give a state jurisdiction with the International Shoe Co. case by point-
ing out that there were sufficient additional activities carried on by the corporate
agents in Wasington to bring that case within the "solicitation plus" rule, al-
though this point was not even mentioned in the opimon.
At this point it might be interesting to examine subsequent decisions in the
state and lower federal courts to determine to what extent they have been in-
fluenced by the International Shoe Co. case, It seems clear that one result of that
decision is to require less corporate activity within the state than was required in.
the past as a basis of asserting jurisdiction, i.e., certain activities may now subject
a foreign corporation to state jurisdiction, although formerly such activities would
not have amounted to "doing business." In a recent case,' the facts of which
are almost on all fours with those of the Green case, the International Shoe Co.
case was cited to support a holding that the defendant corporation was present.
A frequently recurring "mere solicitation" fact situation is that of a foreign
railroad corporation engaged in soliciting freight and passenger business. The
facts in Kilpatrik v. Texas & P Ry. Co.' are typical. The defendant corporation
maintained an office in New York, for the sole purpose of soliciting freight and
passenger business. No bills of lading were issued at tius office, no settlement of
clms made, and no tickets sold. ' Plaintiff brought an action in New York to
recover for personal injuries received in Texas. The District Court applied the
"mere solicitation" rule without referring to the International Shoe Co. case and
granted a motion to dismiss. This decision was reversed in the Circuit Court of
Appeals, Judge Learned Hand stating:
" So far as it [the foreign corporation] must be pres-
ent in order to satisfy the territonal limitation upon the powers of a
court when acting in personam, it should be enough constitutionally
that it shall have extended its activities into the territory where the
courts process runs.": (Italics writer s)
This federal court decision would seem to indicate that solicitation alone may be
sufficient for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. A number of other cases
seem to support this view.' Although the Supreme Court has not yet held that
'Lasky v. Norfolk & W Ry. Co., 157 Fed. 2d 674 (C.C.A. 6th 1946).
-7166 Fed. 2d 788 (C.C.A. 2d 1948).
28Id. at 791.
1 In the following cases foreign corporations were held to be subject to
jurisdiction where the activities of the corporation agents were mainly, if not en-
tirely solicitatious the courts expressly following the International Shoe Co. Case:
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solicitation alone will make a foreign corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
state where it occurred, its opinion on the subject has been intimated. Justice
Rutledge writing the opinion in Nippert v. City of Richmondu involving a states
power to tax interstate commerce, said that the International Shoe Co. case de-
cided that regular and continuous solicitation constitutes "doing business contrary
to prevailing notion." '3 1
Whether it is just to require a foreign corporation to defend a suit brought
in the forum state should not be mechanically determined by a mere weighing of
the amount of activity carried on there; rather a consideration of the nature and
quality of the activities earned on within the state and their connection with the
obligation sued on should be determinative. Where the cause of action arose
from activities earned on by a foreign corporation within the state, the mcon-
vemence and expense of litigation in a foreign jurisdiction should fall on the cor-
poration rather than on the citizens of the forum state who dealt with the cor-
poration. Thus, if a cause of action arises out of a solicitation or solicitations
within a state, that state should have jurisdiction to decide the controversy, and
this is believed to be the result under the International Shoe Co. decision. If the
foreign corporation s activities are only single or isolated acts and the cause of
action is unconnected with them it seems unjust to subject the corporation to the
inconvenience of a suit in a foreign jurisdiction. However, if the corporate opera-
tions within the forum are continuous and substantial, even though the cause of
action did not arise from those operations, the implication of the International
Shoe Co. decision is that the corporation may be required to defend a suit in the
state where those operations were carried on. According to the dictum the Nippert
case regular and continuous solicitation would be sufficient.
The "presence" theory of jurisdiction over a foreign corpoyation is vague and
unsatisfactory. The "fair play and substantial justice" theory enunciated in the
International Shoe Co. case is also somewhat vague and unsatisfactory, but prom-
ises better results than the former doctrine. Neither rule affords definite informa-
tion as to a corporation contemplating some activity in other states. In the future
as in the past the facts in each case must be examined as each case arises. This
is not a desirable state of the law in the United States where business transactions
freely cross state lines.
A better and simpler solution to this perplexing and important problem would
be to allow a state court to take jurisdiction in any action against a foreign cor-
poration which arises out of an act or acts done by its agents within the state, or
when such acts constitute a link in a series of acts which culminate in giving rise
to the liability sued on. Ample support for such a solution can be found in
Supreme Court decisions. A direct analogy for such a rule may be found in the
decisions upholding statutes subjecting non-resident motorists to the jurisdiction
of the state where the liability sued on arose. Also, the Supreme Court de-
cisions conferring jurisdiction on state courts in actions arising out of the sale of
securities by non-residents support this solution to the problem.' If the statutes
Bourze v. Nardis Sportswear, 165 Fed. 2d 33 '(C.C.A. 2d 1948); Marlow v. Hin-
man Milking Mach. Co., 7 F.R.D. 751 (1947); Wooster v. Trinmont Mfg. Co. 356
Mo. 682, 203 S.W 2d 411 (1947).
'See 327 U. S. 416 (1946).3 1Id. at 422.3 3Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
'Henry L. Dougherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935).
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involved in these situations can constitutionally confer jurisdiction upon state courts
over non-resident natural persons, it seems that the same result should be reached
in respect to foreign corporation. The suggested rule would allow state courts
to take jurisdiction over all causes of action connected with solicitation within the
state. It would not include a purely transitory cause of action which is unrelated
to any act done within the state. Perhaps in this class of cases there is greater
merit in the "fair play and substantial justice" theory than any other. If a cor-
poration is carrying on regular and continuous solicitation within the state there
is nothing "unfair" in reqmring it to defend a suit on a transitory cause of action,
but not otherwise.
It is impossible at the present time to determine whether the Green case and
its "mere solicitation" rule has been completely absorbed in the broader theory
of the International Shoe Co. case. However, the reception of the latter case by
the state and lower federal courts and the broad language of the case itself indi-
cate that in the near future, if not already, "mere solicitation" by a corporation
will be sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of the state where the solicitation
occurred. Therefore, if the decision in the Green case has not veen overruled, it
may safely be said that it has been quietly interred.
ARLOE W MAYNE
PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS OF DECEASED EMPLOYEES AS'TAXABLE
INCOME OF THE WIDOW - I.T. 4027
I.T. 4027, recently issued by the Income Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, has laid down the rule that "irrespective of a plan voluntary or invol-
untary, definite or indefinite, payments made by an employer to the widow
of a deceased officer or employee, in consideration of services rendered by the
officer or employee, are includible in the gross income of the widow for Federal
income tax purposes." This ruling, which is applicable to payments received
beginmng January 1, 1951, represents a substantial change from the previous
Treasury position.
In 1921, in O.D. 1017, the Treasury held that a payment to the widow of a
deceased officer of his salary for two months after his death was a gratuity and
was not taxable income of the widow. In I.T. 3329,' in 1939, it was ruled that
payments made for a reasonable time by a corporation to the widow of a de-
ceased officer were deductible by the corporation as a business expense but were
not taxable income to the widow. In this I.T., it was said that "When an allow-
ance is paid by an organization to which the rectpient had rendered no service
[italics, writer s), the amount is deemed to be a gift or gratuity and is not subject
to Federal income tax in the hands of the recipient." Thus, an attractive oppor-
tunity was offered to employers to make tax free "3329 payments'" to widoiws and
still deduct them as a business expense.' It is clear, however, that the courts
have not generally gone as far as the implications of LT. 8329.
'1950 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 21 at 2; 505 CCH par. 6208.
'5 Cum. Bull. 101 [501 CCH par. 52.4741. This was expressly reversed by
I. T. 4027. See also T. D. 2090 to the same effect. Dec. 14, 1914 [501 CCH par.
52.4741. This was expressly overruled by I. T. 4027.
'1939-2 Cum. Bull. 153. This was expressly overruled by L T. 4027 on the
point herein discussed.
'P-H Students Tax Law Service, Current Matter, par. 10, 182' (1950).
